In regard to McArthur's SCAP special staff sections:
Lieutenant Colonel Cecil G. Tilton, Chief of Local Government Division, made a singular contribution to the reform of local administration. Holding a BS and MSc from the University of California (Berkeley) and an MBA from Harvard, he had taught at the Universities of Hawai'i and Connecticut before entering the Army. After training at the University of Virginia School of Military Government, he was recruited to teach at the University of Chicago CATS [Civil Affairs Training School]. Tilton was assisted initially by John W. Maseland of Dartmouth College and Andrew J. Grajdanzev, an ardent advocate of decentralization and home rule. Grajdanzev later played a role in drafting SCAP's land-reform programme. Tilton followed Local Government Division to Eighth Army headquarters when it was transferred there in mid-1948. (158-159)In regard to Grajdanzev's participation in SCAP decisions on land reform:
By mid-October 1945, SCAP, too, had begun to mull the merits of land reform. When Natural Resources Section failed to move quickly on the issue, MacArthur assigned this task to Civil Information and Education Section. On 9 November, General Headquarters issued SCAPIN-257 ('Agricultural Programme') directing the government to submit a plan on its long-range food-production goals by the end of December. The plan did not concern land reform per se but was to include counter-measures for the problem of tenancy, credit, ground rents and taxes. (340)Takemae discusses how SCAPIN-411 ("Rural Land Reform") was written based on the view that "egalitarian land reallotment" would "not only prevent a resurgence of militarism but nip radical Socialist and Communist ambitions in the bud" (341). SCAPIN-411 directed that "the government would buy up land from non-operating owners, sell it to the tillers and eliminate absentee landlordism by transferring their property to landless tenants" (341).
CI&E had drawn up SCAPINs 257 and 411, but now Government Section and Economic and Scientific Section also became involved. Work got under way in February 1946 and, in March, primary responsibility for the reform shifted from CI&E back to Natural Resources Section. The drafting committee included William T. Gilmartin and Ladejinsky of NRS (the latter [a "Russian-born agrarian specialist" who supported land redistribution] having transferred to Japan in December for that purpose); Lieutenant W. Hicks of CI&E; and Thomas Bisson and Dr Andrew J. Grajdanzev of GS. On 9 May, Ladejinsky completed a staff study borrowing heavily from ideas that ["radical Japanese agronomist"] Yagi Yoshinosuke had advanced in 1936: national expropriation of tenanted land and its sale to the tillers, compensation for landlords and entrenched tenancy rights. (341-2)Takemae goes on to describe all the political maneuvering among the delegates of the Allied Council for Japan to nail down the details of the land reform program. There was a lot of haggling over the upper limits of land that landlords could keep--some calling for 5 hectare limits, some calling for 3, and some for 1 hectare. The bill that had to be approved by the Japanese Diet was based on a proposal that "the government fix the amount of tenant-cultivated property a landlord could retain at 1 hectare, impose an absolute limit of 3 hectares (12 in Hokkaido) on all holdings and make the acquisition programme compulsory" (342).
The bill was submitted to the Diet on 7 September 1946, but opposition surfaced from an unexpected quarter. Andrew Grajdanzev of Government Section's Local Government Division protested that the programme was too extreme; what was needed, he said, was 'reform, not revolution.' Grajdanzev convinced GS Chief Whitney to back his demand to clarify exceptions to the 3-hectare upper limit on holdings in a way that would benefit large landowners. Whitney also agreed to modify the composition of the land commissions to favour landlords. [Japanese Agriculture Minister] Wada, however, dug in his heels and refused to budge on the issue, and Schenck threw his full support to the plucky Agriculture Minister, embroiling NRS in a battle royal with the more powerful GS, which won the day. Whitney accused Schenck, in effect, of kowtowing to the Japanese and ultimately browbeat the NRS chief into compliance. Government Section obliged Wada to make exceptions to the 3-hectare limit and impose a land-price ceiling. As Diet deliberations on the amended bill proceeded, NRS abandoned its earlier strategy of secrecy. Schenck warned a Liberal Party delegation of "dire consequences" should Parliament fail to carry the legislation. In that case, he said, the Supreme Commander would have no alternative but to issue a formal directive. The law was enacted without incident on 21 October. (343)Wow. Lots of quoting there. I don't know much about the agrarian reforms in Occupied Japan besides what I quoted here, but this does give me a little more information on what Grajdanzev was up to in Japan after the war.
[Update, 2/12: This might be useful at some point:
331.42 Records of the SCAP Government Section
1945-52
291 lin. ft.
1945-52
291 lin. ft.
Textual Records: Decimal correspondence, 1945-52. SCAP instructions to the Japanese Government ("SCAPINS"), 1945-51. Issuances of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1945-51, and of General Headquarters Far East Command, 1947-51. Records relating to the Far Eastern Commission, 1945-51. Records concerning the Japanese Diet, 1946-52. Records relating to elections, 1945-51. Records relating to the removal or exclusion from office of individuals considered undesirable as public officials ("Purge Files"), 1945- 51. Records concerning the Japanese Civil Service ("National Personnel Authority File"), 1945-51. Records concerning the economic decentralization program ("Zaibatsu File"), 1945-50. Records relating to religious, cultural, economic, and other organizations in Japan, 1945-52. File containing information on Japanese individuals involved in legal cases under U.S. jurisdiction ("Biographical File"), ca. 1945-52.
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